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Bit Error Probability Instead of Secrecy Rate
Criterion to Enhance Performance for Secure
Wireless Communication Systems
Javad Taghipour, Paeiz Azmi, Nader Mokari, Moslem Forouzesh, and Hossein Pishro-Nik
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new practical power
allocation technique based on bit error probability (BEP) for
physical layer security systems. It is shown that the secrecy rate
that is the most commonly used in physical layer security systems,
cannot be a suitable criterion lonely. Large positive values are
suitable for the secrecy rate in physical layer security, but it does
not consider the performance of the legitimate and adversary
users. In this paper, we consider and analyze BEP for physical
layer security systems because based on it, the performance of
the legitimate and adversary users are guaranteed and it is
needed to use lower power. BEP is calculated for the legitimate
and adversary users and it is shown that BEP can be better
criterion for performance evaluation of the physical layer security
systems. Based on BEP, the optimum transmit power is obtained
and a new definition for outage probability is proposed and
obtained theoretically. Also, the proposed approach is applied
for adversary users with unknown mode and the cooperative
adversary users. Simulation results show that the proposed
method needs more than 5dB lower power for different scenarios.
Index Terms— Physical layer security, Secrecy rate, Bit error
probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security that is introduced by Wyner [1] is
one of the hot topics in secure wireless communication net-
works. By employing physical layer security, there is no need
to use encryption, key management and the other complicated
scenarios to apply security in the network. Therefore, it can
be used in low power and low required computation networks
like internet of things (IoT) or wireless sensor networks in 5G.
In physical layer security, secrecy rate is the most important
criterion that is used for performance analysis or resource
allocation procedures. The secrecy rate is defined as the
difference of the capacities of the legitimate user and adversary
user [2]. In recent years, a lot of scenarios and resource
allocation methods are proposed in physical layer security
systems. The most important purpose of these methods is
maximizing the secrecy rate. To maximize the secrecy rate and
apply physical layer security in these networks, transmission
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of artificial noise [3]-[6] and multiple antennas systems [7]-
[9] are commonly used methods. As we know, there are two
conventional categories of jamming signal that are considered
to enhance physical layer security in wireless networks:
• Friendly jamming: In this type of cooperative jamming,
the jamming signal is trained to the legitimate receiver
before network setup [10]-[12].
• Gaussian noise jamming: In this type of cooperative
jamming, the jamming signal is unfamiliar at the legiti-
mate receiver. Note that employing each of the friendly
jamming or Gaussian noise jamming methods enhance
security [13]-[14].
It is clear that friendly jamming causes to increase secrecy
performance with respect to Gaussian noise jamming. Since
the legitimate receiver is able to eliminate jamming signal from
the received signal, hence the secrecy rate increases. It should
be noted that this enhancement in performance imposes higher
implementation complexity compared with Gaussian noise
jamming. Moreover, jamming transmission is performed by
the following methods, 1) Source- based jamming [15], [16], in
this method source combines information signal and jamming
signal, then transmits them together. 2) External nodes-based
jamming: in this method a relay [17][18] or an external jammer
[19] transmits jamming signal. 3) Legitimate destination-based
cooperative jamming: in this method legitimate destination
transmits jamming signal to defraud adversary users [20][22].
Combining of transmit jamming signal or artificial noise
and using multiple antenna attract many attentions. For exam-
ple, transmission of spatially artificial noise signal by using
multiple antenna and beamforming is proposed in [23].
It is necessary to note that physical layer security always
faces with some challenges like channel state information
(CSI) and information about the modes or locations of the
adversary users. To tackle these challenges, the authors in [24]
investigate physical layer security for imperfect channel state
information. Moreover, unknown modes of the adversary users
and unknown location of the adversary for the legitimate users
are studied in [25] and [26], respectively.
In all the mentioned works, the evaluation criterion is the
secrecy rate. The secrecy rate should be a positive value and
it is suitable to be a large positive value. In physical layer
security, the capacity of the adversary users is ignored, and the
difference of the capacities is important. In some applications
and services like voice, it can be more effective and the
adversary users can detect the information signal with the
desired performance. For a positive value of the secrecy rate,
2the adversary users can receive the data information with the
desired bit error probability (BEP). The BEP can be another
criterion to prevent data detection of the adversary users. In
this paper, we consider BEP as a new criterion for power
allocation of the physical layer security systems.
In [27]-[29], the low density parity check (LDPC) channel
coding scheme is used to reach the desired bit error rate (BER)
values for the adversary and legitimate users. By using the
punctured binary LDPC code, the SNR gap in a secure system
is decreased, and the adversary user cannot detect the data
information [27]. These works are related to weak secrecy or
strong secrecy, and they do not consider resource allocation in
secure network. Also, in these methods, the adversary users do
not know the parity check matrix, because this matrix is made
by secret keys and just the legitimate users know about that.
This assumption applies a limitation for the adversary users
and it is in conflict with the physical layer security methods.
In many applications in 5G communication systems like
IoT, device to device (D2D) communication, wireless sensor
network and etc., users cannot utilize high complexity and
high power consumption transmitters and receivers. Therefore,
in some applications like sensor networks, they cannot use the
complicated channel coding schemes like LDPC. Also, if the
adversary users know about the channel decoding mechanism,
they can use the benefit of the channel coding for themselves.
In this paper, to avoid detecting of the data information
by the adversary users, based on the type of services, we
define a threshold value for BEP. In the proposed power
allocation problem, the BEP of the adversary users should
be more than the threshold value to prevent data detection by
the adversary users with the desired performance. Also BEP
of the legitimate users should be less than a threshold value to
detect data information in legitimate receivers with the desired
performance. The modulation type that is used in this paper,
is binary phase shift keying (BPSK), and it is expanded to the
other modulation types. Based on BEP and threshold values,
the optimum power value is obtained.
The outage probability is one of the most important issues
in wireless communication networks. In this paper, a new
definition for the outage probability is proposed based on BEP.
The outage probability that is proposed in this paper is the
probability of the loosing of legitimate receiver performance
or probability of reaching the adversary receiver to a desired
performance. The outage probability is obtained analytically
and it is approved by simulation results.
In most of the works in physical layer security systems, the
adversary users are assumed active or passive. In this paper,
we assume that there is no information about active or passive
mode of the adversary users and it is an unknown information.
Also, for the multi adversary users case, it is assumed that
they can have cooperation with each other to enhance their
performance.
Similar to the commonly used methods for the physical
layer security systems, in this paper, the multiple antenna
system and artificial noise are used to decrease the outage
probability of the network. Also, a simple channel coding
scheme is proposed to enhance the performance of the legiti-
mate receiver without applying any limitation to the adversary
receivers. By using the proposed channel coding scheme, the
outage probability of the network is decreased.
The summary of the contributions are as follows:
• Introducing novel power allocation problem by using
a new BEP based criterion. Based on this problem,
performance of the legitimate user is guaranteed to be
in the desired area and the performance of the adversary
users is guaranteed not to be in the desired area.
• Obtaining the optimum power value for the proposed
optimization problem.
• Proposing a new definition for the outage probability.
• Defining the power allocation problems and solve them
for multi adversary users, unknown mode and cooperative
adversary users scenarios.
• Using multiple antenna transmitter and channel coding to
decrease the outage probability.
• Based on simulation results, it is shown that the proposed
method guarantees the performance of all network users
according to BEP criteria and it needs about 5dB lower
transmit power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The secrecy rate
and study motivation are presented in Section II. The proposed
BEP based power allocation, obtaining optimum transmit
power and the new definition for the outage probability are
presented in Section III. Improving the outage probability
by using multiple antennas transmitter and channel coding
is proposed in Section IV. The performance evaluation and
the simulation results are discussed in Section V. Finally,
concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. THE SECRECY RATE AND STUDY MOTIVATION
We consider a wireless communication network consisting
of a transmitter, one legitimate and an eavesdropper or adver-
sary user. The secrecy rate for this network can be obtained
as follows:
Rs = [log2 (1 + SNRB)− log2 (1 + SNRE)]+, (1)
where SNRB and SNRE are the signal to noise power
ratio (SNR) of the legitimate and adversary receivers and
[x]
+
denotes max {x, 0}. SNR values in this system can be
presented as follows:
SNRB =
α2B|hB|2P
σ2
, (2)
SNRE =
α2E |hE |2P
σ2
, (3)
where |.| is the absolute value, P is the transmit power, hB
is the channel coefficient of the legitimate user with path loss
αB , hE is the channel coefficient of the adversary user with
path loss αE and σ
2 is the additive noise power in the le-
gitimate receiver and adversary user. The channel coefficients
are assumed to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables with unit variance.
Lemma 1. . The secrecy rate that is defined in (1), is an
increasing function for SNRB ≥ SNRE .
3Proof : Based on (1), the first order derivative function of
the secrecy rate can be calculated as follows:
∂Rs
∂P
= (4){
1
log 2
(
α2B |hB |
2
σ2+α2
B
|hB |
2P
− α2E |hE |2
σ2+α2
E
|hE |
2P
)
, SNRB ≥ SNRE
0, SNRB < SNRE .
According to this equation, the secrecy rate obtained in (1), is
an increasing function for SNRB ≥ SNRE . If the channel
power gain of the legitimate user is more than that of the
adversary user, the first derivative function of the secrecy rate
has a positive value and then the secrecy rate function will be
increased by increasing the transmit power. 
In this case, because the secrecy rate increases by increasing
the transmit power, the optimum value for the transmit power
is its maximum value. The maximum power that the transmit-
ter can transmit is the optimum value for the secrecy rate, and
transmitter increases transmit power up to the maximum value.
On the other side, the secrecy rate in (1) has a limited value
and it is not increased to infinity by increasing the transmit
power. The upper bound of the secrecy rate can be obtained
as follows:
lim
P→∞
Rs =
{
log2
(
α2B |hB |
2
α2
E
|hE |
2
)
,SNRB ≥ SNRE
0, SNRB < SNRE.
(5)
Therefore, the secrecy rate value for this system has a maxi-
mum value as follows:
Rs,max = log2
(
α2B|hB|2
α2E |hE|2
)
. (6)
The secrecy rate cannot increase to more than this value by
increasing the transmit power. The secrecy rate is saturated
for the large values of the transmit power. Therefore, it is not
practical to increase the transmit power up to the large values.
To avoid using maximum transmit power, the optimization
problem with minimizing transmit power for a guaranteed
secrecy rate can be used. This problem can be defined as
follows:
min
P
P
s.t. RS ≥ Rmin,
(7)
where Rmin is the minimum value for the secrecy rate that
should be guaranteed for the network. For this problem, the
optimum value of the transmit power is the minimum value of
the transmit power that satisfies the constraint of the problem.
For this problem, there is no need to increase the transmit
power to the maximum value.
The important issue is the work point or the selected value
for the transmit power. If we use the maximum value or a large
value for the transmit power, the secrecy rate is a desired value.
But by using the maximum power value, the adversary user
can receive signal with high SNR value, and he/she can detect
data signal with the desired performance. In this paper, we
consider this issue from the performance view of the legitimate
receiver and the adversary user.
Therefore, we can choose another criterion to obtain the
transmit power value in the transmitter. One of the most
important criteria for performance evaluation in digital com-
munication systems is BEP. BEP can be used for performance
evaluation of the legitimate receiver and the adversary user.
Based on the different services, the BEP can have different
values in communication networks. For example, in long term
evolution (LTE) systems, the maximum value of BEP for voice
services is larger than that for signaling or synchronization
[30].
For the legitimate users and adversary users, by increasing
the transmit power value, BEP for both of them is decreased.
For example, if BPSK is used for a communication system,
increasing the transmit power to the maximum value or a large
value reduces the BEP for both legitimate receiver and the
adversary user.
In the mentioned system model, for a positive secrecy rate,
BEP of an adversary user is more than that of a legitimate
receiver. Although the BEP value for adversary user is more
than that of legitimate receiver, this value can be acceptable for
some services. Then the adversary user can receive and detect
data information without any degradation in the performance.
Therefore, the secrecy rate cannot be a sufficient criterion for
these systems. BEP of BPSK signaling for a specific channel
coefficient is obtained as follows [31]:
BEP = Q
(√
SNR
)
, (8)
where Q (.) is the q function. Based on this equation, BEP is
exponentially decreased by increasing the transmit power for
both legitimate receiver and the adversary user. By increasing
the transmit power to the maximum value, the BEP for the
adversary user can be decreased to the desired value for a
specific service. In this paper, we consider BEP of the users
in power allocation to prevent this problem.
III. PROPOSED BEP BASED POWER ALLOCATION
A. BPSK signaling
In this section, the power allocation problem is defined
based on BEP of the legitimate receiver and the adversary
user. According to the service type, two threshold values are
defined for the legitimate receiver and adversary user. When
BEP of the legitimate receiver is less than a threshold value,
he/she can receive information data without any degradation.
If BEP of the adversary user is more than a threshold value,
he/she cannot receive data information efficiently.
Based on these threshold values, the power allocation prob-
lem can be defined as follows:
min
P
P
s.t. BEPB ≤ T1,
BEPE ≥ T2,
(9)
where BEPB and BEPE are BEP of the legitimate user and
adversary user respectively, T1 is the maximum value for the
BEPB and T2 is the minimum value for BEPE . According
to this problem, BEP for the legitimate user must be less than
a threshold value T1 to reach an efficient performance, and
BEP for the adversary user must be more than a threshold
4value T2, it causes that the adversary user cannot detect data
information efficiently. In the above problem, if BPSK is used
for signaling, it can be rewritten as follows:
min
P
P
s.t. Q
(√
α2
B
|hB |
2P
σ2
)
≤ T1,
Q
(√
α2
E
|hE |
2P
σ2
)
≥ T2.
(10)
Without loss of generality, in this paper we assume that the
power and energy values are the same, and we use power
value instead of energy value in BEP relations. To solve this
problem, it can be rewritten as follows:
min
P
P
s.t. P ≥ σ2
α2
B
|hB |
2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2
,
P ≤ σ2
α2
E
|hE|
2
(
Q−1 (T2)
)2
,
(11)
where Q−1 (.) is the inverse q function. To solve this problem,
it should be a feasible problem. According to the power
constraints, the feasibility condition of this problem can be
obtained as follows:
α2E |hE|2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 ≤ α2B|hB|2(Q−1 (T2))2, (12)
For a feasible problem, the optimum solution for the transmit
power can be calculated as follows:
Popt =
σ2
α2B |hB|2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2
. (13)
For this system, we propose a new definition for the outage
probability as follows:
pOutage = (14)
1− Pr
{
α2E |hE |2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 ≤ α2B|hB|2(Q−1 (T2))2} ,
where Pr {.} is the probability value function. This outage
probability shows the outage of the network from desired
performance of the legitimate user and secure communica-
tion simultaneously. This outage can be because of unsecure
communication or performance degradation of the legitimate
user.
Because the channel coefficients are i.i.d. zero-mean cir-
cularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
unit variance, channel power gains are exponential random
variables. Therefore, the probability of outage can be obtained
as follows:
pOutage =
α2E
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2B(Q
−1 (T2))
2
+ α2E(Q
−1 (T1))
2 . (15)
Based on this problem, if a small value is assigned for the
threshold of the legitimate receiver, the probability of outage is
increased, and it is decreased for large values of the threshold
of legitimate receiver.
B. QPSK signaling and the other type of modulations
Quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) is one of the most
practical modulations that is used in digital communication
systems. Symbol error probability (SEP) of the legitimate
receiver for QPSK can be calculated as follows [31]:
SEPB = 1−

1−Q


√
α2B|hB|2P
2σ2




2
= (16)
2Q


√
α2B|hB|2P
2σ2

 −

Q


√
α2B |hB|2P
2σ2




2
.
Similarly, for the adversary user, the SEP can be obtained as
follows [31]:
SEPE = 2Q


√
α2E |hE |2P
2σ2

−

Q


√
α2E |hE|2P
2σ2




2
.
(17)
If Gray coding is used for bit mapping of symbols in QPSK
signaling, the relation of BEP and SEP is as follows [31]:
BEP ≈ 1
2
SEP. (18)
Based on this BEP value, the optimization problem for the
QPSK signaling can be presented as follows:
min
P
P
s.t. Q
(√
α2
B
|hB |
2P
2σ2
)
− 12
(
Q
(√
α2
B
|hB |
2P
2σ2
))2
≤ T1,
Q
(√
α2
E
|hE |
2P
2σ2
)
− 12
(
Q
(√
α2
E
|hE |
2P
2σ2
))2
≥ T2,
(19)
In this problem, the threshold values for BEP are like the
thresholds in problem (9). Since the error probability of the
users should be a small value, we can eliminate the second
term of the error probability relation. Therefore, the optimiza-
tion problem for QPSK signaling can be approximated as
follows:
min
P
P
s.t. Q
(√
α2
B
|hB |
2P
2σ2
)
≤ T1,
Q
(√
α2
E
|hE |
2P
2σ2
)
≥ T2.
(20)
The feasibility constraint of this problem is similar to the
BPSK case in problem (12), and for a feasible problem, the
approximated optimum solution for the transmit power can be
calculated as follows:
PAppopt =
2σ2
α2B|hB|2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2
. (21)
In general case, we can expand our proposed solution for M-
ary modulations like quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM).
These modulation types have complicated bit error rate for-
mula. Because of the complicated formulas, we cannot use
these formulas in the optimization problem. The proposed
5solution for these problems is using boundary of the error
probability. One of the useful boundaries that is used for
error probability is using minimum distance [31]. Minimum
distance is the minimum Euclidean distance between symbols
of a QAM signaling. Based on the minimum distance, the
boundary for SEP can be obtained as follows:
SEP ≤ Q
(
dmin
2σ
)
, (22)
where dmin is the minimum Euclidean distance between sym-
bols. For this case, the optimization problem and its solution
are like the BPSK case. Also Q function in the optimization
problems does not have a closed-form formula. We can use
the Chernoff bound as an approximation for Q function as
follows [31]:
Q(x) ≈ 1
2
exp
(
−x
2
2
)
, (23)
where exp (.) is the exponential function. Based on this
approximation, the approximated optimization problem for
BPSK signaling as an example can be obtained as follows:
min
P
P
s.t. α2B|hB|2P ≥ −2σ2 ln (2T1) ,
α2E |hE |2P ≤ −2σ2 ln (2T2) .
(24)
For a feasible solution of this optimization problem, the
approximated optimum transmit power value can be obtained
as follows:
PAppopt =
−2σ2 ln (2T1)
α2B |hB|2
. (25)
C. Multiple adversary users case
In this subsection, we assume that there are E adversary
users in the network. The secrecy rate in this case is the
minimum value with considering all of these adversary users.
As mentioned in the previous section, the important challenge
is the work point of the transmit power. In optimization
problem for the multiple adversary users scenario, the BEP for
all adversary users should be more than the threshold value.
Therefore, the optimization problem for BPSK signaling can
be presented as follows:
min
P
P
s.t. Q
(√
α2
B
|hB |
2P
σ2
)
≤ T1,
Q
(√
α2e|he|
2P
σ2
)
≥ T2, e = 1, ..., E,
(26)
where he and αe and are the channel coefficient and path
loss of adversary user e. For a feasible problem, the optimum
solution is similar to the problem (11), and it is obtained
in (13). According to the constraints of this problem, the
feasibility condition for this problem can be presented as
follows:
max
e
((
Q−1 (T1)
)2 × α2e|he|2) ≤ (Q−1 (T2))2α2B|hB|2.
(27)
According to this constraint, the outage probability can be
obtained as follows:
pOutage = 1− Pr
{
max
e
((
Q−1 (T1)
)2 × α2e|he|2) ≤(
Q−1 (T2)
)2
α2B|hB|2
}
.
(28)
We define parameter z as z = max
e
((
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2e|he|2
)
.
To obtain this probability value, at first, the probability dis-
tribution function (PDF) of parameter z should be obtained.
It is the maximum value of exponential random variables and
based on probability theories in [32], the PDF can be obtained
as follows:
fZ
(
z = max
e
((
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2e|he|2
))
= (29)
E∑
e=1

F ′e(z)∏
i6=e
Fe(z)

,
where Fe(.) is the exponential cumulative distribution
function of
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2e|he|2 with parameter λe =
1/
((
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2e
)
and F ′e(.) is the first order derivative
function of Fe(.). Therefore, the outage probability can be
rewritten as follows:
pOutage = 1− Pr {z ≤ y} = 1−
+∞∫
0
y∫
0
fZ(z)fY (y)dzdy,
(30)
where y =
(
Q−1 (T2)
)2
α2B|hB|2 and fY (y) is the exponential
PDF with parameter λy = 1/
((
Q−1 (T2)
)2
α2B
)
. By substi-
tuting the distribution functions in (30), the outage probability
can be obtained as (31), in the top of next page.
D. Adversary users with unknown mode
At the previous subsections, we assume that the adversary
user is a passive user and he/she just eavesdrops in the channel
of the legitimate receivers. Generally, the adversary users can
be passive or active. In the active mode, the adversary users
can send jamming signal to disrupt in the communication of
the legitimate users. In the most of the works about physical
layer security, the modes of the adversary users are known
and the system model and power allocation are obtained
based on it. In this subsection, we assume that the modes
of the adversary users are unknown, and there is no more
information about the adversary users. For this scenario, we
assume the worst case for the network. Because the modes of
the adversary users are unknown, we assume the best case for
the adversary users, and the result is the worst case for the
network. We consider the interference value of the adversary
users like additive Gaussian noise signal. Also, it is assumed
that the adversary users can cancel this interference value,
because there is no more information about them and also,
this assumption is the worst case for the network. The best
case for the adversary users is assuming the best user as a
passive user and the others as the active users [25]. The best
adversary user has the largest channel gain for eavesdropping.
6pOutage = 1−
+∞∫
0
y∫
0
(
E∑
e=1
(
λee
−λez
∏
i6=e
(
1− e−λez)
))(
λye
−λyy
)
dzdy
= 1−
+∞∫
0
∏
e
(
1− e−λez)∣∣∣∣
y
0
(
λye
−λyy
)
dy =
+∞∫
0
∏
e
(
1− e−λey) (λye−λyy) dy
= 1−
+∞∫
0
(
1− e−λ1y) (1− e−λ2y) ... (1− e−λEy) (λye−λyy) dy
= 1−
+∞∫
0
(
λye
−λyy − λye−(λ1+λy)y − λye−(λ2+λy)y − ...+ λye−(λ1+λ2+λy)y + ...+ (−1)Eλye−(λ1+...+λE+λy)y
)
dy
=
λy
λ1+λy
+
λy
λ2+λy
+ ...+
λy
λE+λy
− λy
λ1+λ2+λy
− ...
=
E∑
i=1
λy
λi+λy
− ∑
i,j
i6=j
λy
λi+λj+λy
+
∑
i,j,k
i6=j 6=k
λy
λi+λj+λk+λy
− ...− (−1)E λy
λ1+λ2+...+λE+λy
.
(31)
In this case, the optimization problem can be presented as
follows:
min
P
P
s.t. Q
(√
α2
B
|hB |
2P
σ2+I
)
≤ T1,
Q
(√
max
e
{α2e|he|2}P
σ2
)
≥ T2,
(32)
where I is the interference value from the active adversary
users, and it is assumed that it is a Gaussian random variable.
In this problem, we assume that the adversary users want to
receive data information with high performance. The adversary
user with high performance is a passive user and the others
send jamming signal to disrupt in the communication of
the legitimate receivers. Therefore, the other adversary users
do not eavesdrop and they send jamming signals to make
interference at the legitimate receivers.
Based on the previous subsection, for a feasible solution,
the optimum transmit power can be obtained as follows:
Popt =
σ2 + I
α2B |hB|2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2
. (33)
As we can see in this problem, the optimum transmit power is
increased with interference, it is needed to use more transmit
power to reach the proper performance in the presence of the
interference of the adversary users. The feasibility constraint
for this problem can be presented as follows:(
σ2 + I
) (
Q−1 (T1)
)2 ×max
e
(
α2e|he|2
)
≤ (34)
σ2
(
Q−1 (T2)
)2
α2B|hB|2.
Based on this constraint, the outage probability is like (31)
with the following parameters:

λy = 1/
(
σ2
(
Q−1 (T2)
)2
α2B
)
,
λe = 1/
((
σ2 + I
) (
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2e
)
.
(35)
E. Cooperative adversary users
The adversary users can have cooperation with each other
to reach a better performance. The adversary users can use the
techniques that are used in wireless communication systems
like maximum ratio combining (MRC). We assume that they
have a central node to receive and process all data of the
adversary users. If they use the MRC technique, the BEP
constraint in the optimization problem for the adversary users
can be presented as follows:
Q


√√√√∑
e
{
α2e|he|2
}
P
σ2

 ≥ T2. (36)
Based on this constraint, the optimum transmit power value for
a feasible problem is similar to (13). In this case, the outage
probability can be obtained as follows:
pOutage = 1− Pr
{(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 ×∑
e
(
α2e|he|2
)
≤(
Q−1 (T2)
)2
α2B|hB|2
} (37)
To obtain the outage probability in a closed-form, we define
w =
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 × ∑
e
(
α2e|he|2
)
, the PDF of variable w
should be calculated. It is summation of E exponential ran-
dom variables. Based on the theorems of probability random
variables [32], it can be obtained as follows:
fW
(
w =
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 ×∑
e
(
α2e|he|2
))
= (38)
(∏
e
λe
)
E∑
e=1
e−λew∏
i,i6=e
(λi − λe) ,
where λe = 1/
((
Q−1 (T1)
)2
α2e
)
is the parameter of the
exponential random variable
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 (
α2e|he|2
)
. Similar
7to (30), the outage probability can be rewritten as follows:
pOutage = 1− Pr {w ≤ y} = 1−
+∞∫
0
y∫
0
fW (w)fY (y)dwdy
= 1−
+∞∫
0
y∫
0
(∏
e
λe
)
E∑
e=1
e−λew∏
i,i6=e
(λi−λe)
(
λye
−λyy
)
dwdy
= 1−
+∞∫
0
(∏
e
λe
)
E∑
e=1
1
λe
(1−e−λey)
∏
i,i6=e
(λi−λe)
(
λye
−λyy
)
dy =
1−
(∏
e
λe
)
E∑
e=1
1∏
i,i6=e
(λi−λe)
(
1
λe+λy
)
.
(39)
Based on this equation, for two and three adversary users, the
outage probability can be obtained as follows:
For E = 2:
pOutage = 1− (λ1λ2)
(
1
λ2−λ1
× 1
λ1+λy
+ 1
λ1−λ2
× 1
λ2+λy
)
= 1−
(
λ1λ2
λ2−λ1
)(
1
λ1+λy
− 1
λ2+λy
)
.
(40)
For E = 3:
pOutage = 1− (λ1λ2λ3)
(
1
(λ2−λ1)(λ3−λ1)
× 1
λ1+λy
+
1
(λ1−λ2)(λ3−λ2)
× 1
λ2+λy
+ 1(λ1−λ3)(λ2−λ3) × 1λ3+λy
)
.
(41)
IV. IMPROVING OUTAGE PROBABILITY BY USING
MULTIPLE ANTENNAS TRANSMITTER AND CHANNEL
CODING
In this subsection, two approaches are proposed to improve
the outage probability. By using the multiple antenna transmit-
ter, it is possible to apply beamforming to send artificial noise
and data signals simultaneously and degrade the performance
of the adversary users. Also, channel coding techniques are
adopted to improve BEP in digital communication systems.
In the proposed system, we can use channel coding to reduce
BEP of the legitimate receiver and improve the outage prob-
ability.
A. Multiple antenna transmitter and sending artificial noise
One of the most useful techniques in physical layer security
is using beamforming and sending artificial noise to confuse
the adversary users. In this section, we assume that the
transmitter is equipped with M antennas to send data and
artificial noise signals via beamforming. In this system, the
received signals at the legitimate and adversary users can be
obtained as follows:
yB = h
T
Bwdxd + h
T
Bwanxan + nB, (42)
ye = h
T
e wdxd + h
T
e wanxan + ne, e = 1, ..., E, (43)
where hB and he are M × 1 channel vectors from the
transmitter to the legitimate user and adversary user e, wd
and wan are beamforming vectors for data and artificial noise
signals, xd and xan are data and artificial noise signals with
power values Pd and Pan, and nB and ne are the zero-
mean complex Gaussian noise signals at legitimate user and
adversary user e with variances σ2.
The beamforming vectors are designed by using the channel
vectors. The conventional beamforming is applied at the
transmitter for data signal, and artificial noise is sent in the null
space of the legitimate user. Then, the beamforming vectors
are calculated as follows:
h
H
Bwd = ‖hB‖ , (44)
h
H
Bwan = 0, M > 1. (45)
where ‖.‖ is the norm function. Channel coefficients are
assumed i.i.d. zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian random variables. Based on the beamforming vectors
and the defined threshold values in the previous section, the
optimization problem for this scenario can be proposed as
follows:
min
Pd,Pan
(Pd + Pan)
s.t. Q
(√
‖hB‖
2Pd
σ2
)
≤ T1,
Q
(√
‖hHe wd‖
2Pd
σ2+‖hHe wan‖
2Pan
)
≥ T2, e = 1, ..., E.
(46)
This optimization problem can be rewritten as follows:
min
Pd,Pan
(Pd + Pan)
s.t. σ2
(
Q−1 (T1)
)2 − ‖hB‖2Pd ≤ 0,∥∥hHe wd∥∥2Pd − (Q−1 (T2))2×(
σ2 +
∥∥hHe wan∥∥2Pan) ≤ 0, e = 1, ..., E.
(47)
The above optimization problem is a convex problem and it
can be solved by using CVX MATLAB toolbox or the other
methods such as the dual approach [33].
B. Channel coding
For some services like signaling, low value for BEP is
needed for the legitimate users. Based on the previous sec-
tions, low threshold value for BEP of the legitimate users
increases the outage probability. High outage probability value
for services with high priority is not acceptable in a real
network. Therefore, to decrease the outage probability of the
network, we propose to apply channel coding techniques.
In this paper, we assume that the users of the network are
not equipped with high performance processors and they are
not high power consumption. Therefore, in this section, we
use low complexity channel coding scheme to enhance the
performance of the network. The block based codes are used
for these services. Channel coding design is based on the
threshold value for BEP of the adversary users. In this paper,
without loss of generality we assume that the error correction
is used at the receivers. The block code that is used in this
paper is assumed with length N and it can correct t errors
in each block. If t or less than t errors are occurred in each
block, this channel coding technique can correct these errors
but if the number of errors is more than t, this channel coding
technique cannot correct errors in each block. Therefore, based
on the threshold values for legitimate and adversary users,
8TABLE I: Simulation parameters
σ2 0.01
T1 It is variable
T2 0.05
E 1, 2 and 3
M 4
N 63
t 1
the proposed values for length N and t for a block coding
technique can be obtained as follows:{
BEPe ×N >> t,
BEPB ×N << t. (48)
By using these inequalities, the legitimate user has less than t
errors in each block with high probability, and the adversary
users have more than t errors in each block with high proba-
bility. Therefore, the block code with capability of correction
of t errors can correct the errors of the legitimate users in
each block but it cannot correct the errors of the adversary
users. Also, in this scenario there is no limitation for decoding
technique at the adversary users and it is assumed that the
adversary users know about coding and decoding techniques
exactly.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Based on the system model, we assume that there are one
transmitter and legitimate receiver and some adversary users in
the network. We assume that the channel coefficients are i.i.d.
zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables with unit variance. All simulation parameters are
presented in Table 1.
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Fig. 1: The secrecy rate vs. Transmit power.
In Fig. 1, the secrecy rate that is presented in (1) is shown
for different values of the transmit power. As shown in this
figure, the secrecy rate increases with increasing the transmit
power, but it is saturated for the large values of the transmit
power, i.e., the secrecy rate is converged to the maximum
value.
In Fig. 2, BEP of the legitimate receiver and the adversary
user are presented. For the large values of the transmit power,
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Fig. 2: BEP vs. Transmit power.
the BEPs for the legitimate receiver and the adversary user
have small values and they can be acceptable for some
networks or services. Therefore, increasing transmit power to
the large values is not recommended in these systems, and it
is needed to have some constraints on BEP of the users.
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Fig. 3: The optimum power value for different number of the
adversary users.
The optimum transmit power for different values of T1
is presented in Fig. 3. If the threshold value for the error
probability of the legitimate user increases, the optimum power
value decreases, because the bit error threshold value for the
legitimate user can be satisfied by a lower transmit power
value. Also, the other important result of this figure is decreas-
ing the power value for multi adversary users case. If there
are more adversary users in the network, the ability that they
can reach the desired error probability is increased. Therefore,
the transmit power value for the multi adversary users case
is decreased to prevent decreasing the error probability of
adversary users. On the other hand, based on the optimum
transmit power formula, it is not depended on the number of
adversary users. The point is the feasibility of the optimization
problem for the multi adversary users case. In this case, the
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Fig. 4: The outage probability for different number of the adversary
users.
optimization problem is feasible for the large values of the
channel power gain for the legitimate user. For the large
channel power gains of the legitimate receiver, the optimum
transmit power has smaller values.
The outage probability is shown in Fig. 4. The outage
probability increases for the multi adversary users case and
decreases for large bit error probability threshold for the
legitimate receiver. Moreover, the simulation results confirm
the theoretical formulas for the outage probability for the
different number of the adversary users.
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Fig. 5: The optimum power value for cooperative adversary users and
unknown mode.
In Fig. 5, the optimum transmit power is presented for the
cooperative adversary users and unknown mode. As we can
see, optimum power for the MRC mode is less than optimum
power for the unknown mode. In MRC, the adversary users
combine the received signals to reach a better performance,
therefore, the optimum transmit power should be a small value
to prevent signal detection of the adversary users with desired
performance.
In Fig. 6, the outage probability is illustrated for the
cooperative adversary users and unknown modes. The outage
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Fig. 6: The outage probability for cooperative adversary users and
unknown mode.
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Fig. 7: Outage probability with channel coding.
probability for the cooperative adversary users case is less
than that of the adversary users with unknown modes. In the
adversary users with the unknown modes, we assume that they
send jamming signal to increase the BEP of the legitimate
users, and in this case we assume the worst case for the
network. Therefore, the outage probability in this case has
a larger value. Also, the simulations confirm the theoretical
formulas for the outage probability for the different scenarios.
In Fig. 7, the outage probability is shown with channel
coding technique. The Hamming code is used for this scenario.
The threshold value for the adversary users is assumed 0.05.
Based on this threshold value, the parameters of Hamming
code are selected as N = 63 and t = 1. As we can see in Fig.
7, the outage probability is decreased for the different number
of the adversary users.
In Fig. 8, the outage probability is shown for multiple
antenna transmitter. As seen, when beamforming with artificial
noise signal is used in the network the outage probability is
decreased efficiently.
BEP for the legitimate and adversary users are shown in
Figs. 9 and 10 for traditional and proposed methods. Fig. 9
10
10-6 10-5 10-4
T1
10-3
10-2
10-1
P
O
u
ta
ge
Without AN
With AN and MISO
Fig. 8: Outage probability with using beamforming and sending
artificial noise.
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Transmit Power (dB)
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
BE
P
Legitimate receiver, proposed
Eavesdropper, proposed
Legitimate receiver, traditional
Eavesdropper, traditional
Fig. 9: BEP of the legitimate and adversary users.
shows BEP for the single antenna transmitter. Based on this
figure, the proposed method has lower BEP for the legitimate
user. Also, Fig. 10 shows BEP for multiple antenna transmitter
with beamforming and sending artificial noise signal, and BEP
of the legitimate user in the proposed method has lower value.
The minimum secrecy rate for simulation of the traditional
method in these figures is Rmin = 2. As we can see in
these figures, the proposed method needs more than 5dB lower
power for different scenarios in high SNR values.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, based on BEP, a new power allocation
approach was proposed for physical layer security systems.
Threshold values were defined for BEP of the legitimate
and adversary users and the power allocation problem and
the optimum transmit power were obtained based on these
threshold values. Moreover, the proposed approach was ap-
plied in the presence of the multi adversary users, cooperative
adversary users and adversary users with unknown modes. In
this paper, a new definition for the outage probability was
defined and it was obtained analytically for different scenarios.
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Fig. 10: BEP of the legitimate and adversary users by using beam-
forming and artificial noise.
A simple channel coding scheme and artificial noise were used
to improve the outage probability of the network. The BEP for
the proposed method is better than that of a traditional method
that is used just the secrecy rate.
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